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Abstract: 
This article is based upon ethnographic fieldwork in a Norwegian psychiatric unit practicing a 
psycho- educational treatment of young adults diagnosed with schizophrenia. An aim of the 
programis that patients learn to detect and monitor their ‘symptoms’ in order to obtain ‘insight 
into their own illness’, thus transforming themselves into self-governed and self-responsible 
subjects who are able to cope with life outside institutions. The program is constituted within 
a medical framework with strong emphasis on medicine-compliance. I explore the dynamics 
of power relations inherent in the program, referring to Foucault’s descriptions of discipline 
and normalisation through pedagogy and examinations. His concepts of governmentality and 
self-technologies have proved useful as a frame for a critical evaluation of such programs. 
However, subjectivities cannot be read off directly from educational technology, and my data 
from everyday, mundane settings in the institution reveal paradoxes and contradictions which 
are accounted for in this study. 
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Introduction 
In this article I focus on how  subjectivities emerge and transform in relation to a psycho-
educational program treating people diagnosed with schizophrenia; in this particular case a 
Norwegian educational program labelled ‘An Independent Life’ (AIL hereafter).The article is 
based upon eight months of ethnographic fieldwork in a Norwegian rehabilitation unit.  
Referring to Michel Foucault, I explore the creation and expression of power relations 
through AIL and how the programme aims at teaching patients self-observation, self-
classification and self-examination in accordance with the psychiatric diagnostic vernacular. 
The  objective of the program is self-governance and independency, and through a specific 
knowledge-regime designed for regulating psychotic thoughts, feelings and behaviour, 
patients are supposed to ‘detect and manage symptoms with the help of professionals from the 
psychiatric field’ (from the introduction of the AIL- program’s workbook,  in Gråwe, 1991, 
my translation).  I will discuss how this takes place in everyday practice in the institution and 
how the program affects the people there. 
 
To say that psychiatric knowledge and technology represent power is hardly controversial 
today. However, we are not dealing with a ‘one to one’ exploiting/exploited perspective, but a 
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rather large and ambiguous field of power-knowledge relations, as laid out by Foucault (1972, 
2001a). This complex type of power is displayed, not mainly through a centralised state or 
‘the law’, but through governmental apparatuses, institutions and procedures (the psycho- 
educational program is a particular example), aiming at the welfare, security and governance 
of the population, where the mental health field seems to pose a particular challenge.  
 
Foucault (2001b, p. 220) states that ‘we live in the era of a “governmentality” first discovered 
in the eighteenth century’. His writings on self-technologies and governmentality are perhaps 
even more relevant today. Self-governance and self-care are traditional Western liberal ideals.  
Thus, psycho educational programs may be associated with the increasing neo-liberalism in 
Western societies. On the one hand, patients are expected to be self-governed and 
independent, to live a life outside an institution. On the other hand, such ‘freedom’ outside the 
institution is limited and constricted in several ways. In addition to social and economic 
limitations of ‘freedom’, people with mental health difficulties are not free to think or speak 
as they wish. They are expected to accept having a stigmatising chronic psychiatric illness 
(Estroff, 1993) and taking medicines which have a severe impact on their cognitive functions 
(Breggin and Cohen, 1999). What is to be done with individuals who do not accept the 
definition of illness presented to them, who are not able to or willing to govern themselves i.e. 
to comply with the program set up for them? What about people who do not see their 
problems as illness and claim their right to refuse medication? These questions are indeed 
political, ethical and economic. The various rehabilitation programs aiming at helping patients 
to govern themselves are perhaps not solely expressions of democracy and liberation. As Rose 
points out, ‘modern individuals are not merely “free” to chose, but obliged to be free’ (Rose, 
1999, p.87). The change from taking care of ill people to teaching them responsibility for their 
own health has become a technology of ‘responsibilisation’ (Rose, 1999, p.74). For example, 
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the introduction of the concept of ‘self-care’ in nursing literature in the 1970s (Orem, 1971) 
almost created a revolution in nursing theory and practice. To be able to cope, to be 
independent and autonomous are highly valued properties described in nursing literature 
today.  The individual has a ‘duty to feel well’, a moral responsibility to ‘stay well’ (Greco, 
1993, p.357) and an obligation to have self-esteem. Cruikshank (1993 p.330)  argues that 
‘those who have failed to link their personal fulfilment to social reform are lumped together as 
“social problems”, diagnosed as “lacking self-esteem” and charged with “anti-social” 
behaviour’. Responsible, worthy patients on the other hand, comply with experts’ advice in 
order to obtain self-care and independence. Such ‘freedom’ is referred to by Rose (1999, 
p.137-166) as ‘advanced liberalism’; in order ‘to govern better, the state must govern less’ 
(Rose, 1999,p.139).  A different kind of subject emerges, i.e.  an individual who does not need 
to be governed by others but are ‘free’ to govern him/herself; as expressed in this study by the 
term ‘An Independent Life’.  
 
However, my objective is also to go beyond a power-knowledge perspective. My field data 
reveal that subjects are not only passively formed or produced by psychiatric discourses or 
governmental apparatuses. I focus on human agency and lived experience, reflecting on how 
subjects create and re-create themselves in local interactions (Biehl et al 2005, p.14). Not 
leaving Foucault’s and Rose’s works aside, I address the issue of experience; how 
subjectivities emerge, are shaped and reshaped through a flow of multiple, diverse and 
sometimes paradoxical everyday experiences in a psychiatric institution. Studies of lived 
human experiences in local, mundane settings in the present have not been issues in Rose’s or 
Foucault’s analyses. Blackman et al (2008, p.15) state that ‘Experience […] was always an 
important element for understanding subjectivity’ and ‘the role of experience […] has always 
accompanied the concept of subjectivity ‘ 
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 Kleinman and Fitz-Henry (2007) deal with the issue of subjectivities and experience in a 
recent anthology. They point out that subjectivities are interactive, multiple, never static, 
always in-flux (p.55), writing that ‘Experience is intersubjective inasmuch it involves 
practices, negotiations and contestations with others with whom we are connected. It is also 
the medium within which collective and subjective processes fuse, enter into dialectical 
relationships, and mutually condition each other’ (p 53). 
Through examples from my fieldwork, I describe how such practices, negotiations and 
contestations take place in a psychiatric institution. I also aim at illustrating the ambiguity and 
bewilderment in psychiatric care today, and how people, both patients and helpers, interact 
and influence each other in everyday settings  
 
Psycho- educational  programs 
Psycho- educational programs in psychiatry emerged at the end of 1970.  The impetus for the 
creation of such treatment programs was the explicit aim of many Western countries to 
reintegrate psychiatric patients into society. This development also took place in Norway. 
Inspired by the de- institutionalisation reform in Italy, several large psychiatric hospitals and 
asylums in Norway were closed down during the 1980s, and patients were transferred to open 
care in their communities. Independence, self-care and ability to cope with life became highly 
valued properties during this reform. However, many communities did not have the resources, 
competence or ability to take care of these patients in a proper way. Although Norway has a 
well developed, public welfare system compared to many other countries, several of these 
patients became marginalised and were left alone in poor conditions without the ability to care 
for themselves. The introduction of psycho- educational programs should also be viewed 
against this background. The programs are for the most developed within a biomedical 
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framework where acceptance of drug intervention is crucial in coping with illness (Falloon et 
al, 1996, Terkelsen et al 2005). Recent research in genetics and pharmaceuticals, and the 
refinement of psychiatric classification systems such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV, APA 1995) and the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD-10, WHO1992) have contributed to this development. Within this framework 
schizophrenia is regarded as a distinct disease, caused by imbalance in chemical 
neurotransmitters in the brain, characterized by ‘well-defined’ symptoms, such as 
hallucinations, delusions, ambivalence, thought disorders and social withdrawal. These 
symptoms are perceived as essential and self-evident. Extensive literature show that 
schizophrenia is an incoherent, invalid concept, and no consistent evidence for a brain 
malfunction or disorder has yet been identified (Bentall, 2003, Boyle, 2002, Johnstone, 2001, 
Thomas, 1997).  Nevertheless, patients are expected to adopt the biomedical explanation, 
accept that they are ill and adjust themselves through education and medicine compliance. 
 
A limited body of research and evaluation of the psycho-educational programs exists, 
focussing on reduction of symptoms and prevention of relapse. The authors, mostly 
psychologists and psychiatrists, emphasise what they consider positive effects on symptoms 
and relapse (e.g., Hogarty et al 1991, Goldstein & Miklowitz 1995, Bentsen 2003). A review 
of 10 studies concludes that psycho education is useful in the treatment of schizophrenia. 
Usefulness is measured by medicine compliance and decrease in readmission (Pekkala & 
Merinder, 2006). Ethical aspects associated with this treatment are, however, not discussed, 
nor questions related to the dynamics of power - knowledge in educational programs. 
According to my study, usefulness should be measured by how patients define it. Field data 
reveal that several patients object to the AIL program and do not find it useful at all. 
 
 6
Context and methodological challenges 
The rehabilitation unit (Sunhilli hereafter), is nicely situated, surrounded by a large garden, 
close to a medium-sized Norwegian town. The institution is characterised by a homely, light 
atmosphere with tasteful furniture and art on the walls. The staff points at surroundings as 
important in order to make patients feel ‘normal’. Each patient has his/her own room. There 
are no locked doors except in the staff’s offices, and patients are free to leave the institution in 
their ‘spare’ time, as long as they tell the staff where they are going and when they will return. 
The staff is well educated; most of the nurses have had 1-2 years of specialisation in advanced 
psychiatric nursing. My impression was also that both nurses and therapists were highly 
motivated and engaged in the welfare of the patients.  
 
The institution has the capacity to treat 10 patients diagnosed with schizophrenia at the one 
time. 36 (of 40) people gave their informed consent to participate in the field-work: 11 male 
patients between the age of  19-40, 4 female patients between 20-30, 10 female and 2 male 
nurses, 4 male and 1 female therapistsii, and 4 female student nurses in their twenties. All 
participants were white ethnic Norwegians living in the southern part of Norway. 
 
I stayed in the institution several times a week throughout the fieldwork period, carrying out 
participant observation and having conversations with varying degrees of formality with all 
participants. I observed and systematically recorded people’s verbal and non-verbal 
interaction inside and outside the institution. I had access to an office where I could retire to 
write my field-notes regularly several times a day. I told all participants that I was taking 
field-notes, and in the beginning they seemed uneasy, but they told me that they got used to it 
after a while. I participated in all the activities of the unit, such as meetings, individual 
psychotherapy sessions with therapists and patients, physiotherapy sessions, and informal 
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social interaction, taking notes either simultaneously or immediately after the sessions. In 
addition to informal conversations, interviews with 9 patients, 2 ex-patients who visited the 
institution regularly and 11 professionals were tape- recorded, transcribed verbatim and 
analysed according to ethnographic methodology (Miles and Huberman 1994, Agar 1980).  
Some of the patients were interviewed several times. I also had access to and reviewed 
hospital records and had regular contact with some of the patients after they were discharged. 
 
Having previously been a nurse working in psychiatric hospitals, I easily got access to all 
rooms in the institution. This was an advantage, but also a challenge, because as a fieldworker 
aiming at an ethnographic space, I had to distance myself as a nurse. I was treated by the 
nurses as ‘one of them’ and balanced between observation and participation. Thus my data 
were of a different kind than the data collected by the staff. A particularly useful space in the 
field was the smoking room where staff seldom came. I was impressed by how openly the 
patients spoke about themselves. An ethical issueiii was raised when some patients wanted to 
make appointments with me as if I were a staff member, although it seemed that they 
distinguished my role as a researcher from the role of the professional staff. 
  
Psycho-education  
The psycho-educational program (AIL) at Sunhill consisted of three courses: the first on 
managing symptoms, the second on social conversational skills and the third on body 
awareness. There were three sessions a week, each lasting about one and a half hours. The 
program was based on ideas of American psychiatrists (Liberman et al 1985) and translated 
and modified by the Norwegian psychologist Gråwe (1991). The assumption was that people 
with psychosis have particular problems in these three areas, and that they would manage 
daily life in a better way if they learned about their illness through theoretical lessons and 
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practical exercises within these areas. Nurses were in charge of the first two courses, while a 
physiotherapist ran the final course.  
 
The aim of the first course was to teach patients to detect symptoms of a relapse into 
psychosis and to manage ‘persistent symptoms’ of schizophrenia. Gråwe (1991) has compiled 
a workbook which patients in this unit were expected to use under nurse guidance. In the 
second course patients were trained to enhance their conversational skills. The body 
awareness course consisted of simple physical exercises and relaxation techniques.  
 
It seemed that the ‘Managing symptoms course’ (MSC hereafter) was rather unpopular among 
several patients, but that they were more willing to attend the ‘Social conversation skills 
course’, probably because they felt they had problems in this area. Many patients complained 
about lack of concentration, that their thoughts just stopped, that they did not know what to 
talk about in an ordinary conversation. I felt the atmosphere in the Social-conversation course 
was less tense than in the MSC. Patients appeared to be more engaged, talking and laughing 
more, seemingly enjoying the funny situations that sometimes appeared during role-plays. 
 
 I will particularly focus on the MSC because it involved questions of governance and 
regulation to a much larger extent than the other two courses All three courses were 
compulsory, but staff could decide that a patient should attend one, all, or none of the courses, 
depending on an assessment of the patient’s condition. 
In the MSC, patients were to achieve skills related to the following four areas:  
1) To recognise warning symptoms of relapse 
2) To manage warning symptoms 
3) To manage persistent symptoms  
 9
4) To avoid alcohol and drugs (Gråwe1991, p.65, my translation). 
 
Patients were thoroughly tested with multiple choice questionnaires, in which they were asked 
what they would do in the case of symptoms of a relapse. An example of one of the questions 
was:  
I can reduce the danger of relapse by: 
1) Learning to manage my disease  
2) Ignoring my symptoms 
3) Stopping taking medicine 
4) Taking painkillers every day (Gråwe, 1991:65, my translation). 
 
It is implied that some of the answers are ‘right’ and some are ‘wrong’. The three latter 
alternatives are obviously ‘wrong’ answers. 
 
Symptoms were divided into ‘warning signs’ of relapse and ‘persistent symptoms’ of 
schizophrenia. For each sign and symptom, the workbook describes examples, and patients 
are expected to monitor their own symptoms. ‘Warning signs of relapse’ were classified as 
deviations in sleep, appetite, mood, thought, feeling or behaviour. Examples of ‘changes in 
thoughts and feelings’ were ‘being suspicious’ or ‘becoming excessively religious’. The 
‘persistent symptoms’ of schizophrenia were described as ‘hearing voices’, ‘suspiciousness 
towards other people’ and ‘depressive feelings’(Gråwe1991). Patients were given a 
registration and classification formula with squares to fill in every day. They were supposed 
to grade the strength of their signs and symptoms on a scale from strong, moderate, and weak 
to none. In this way patients were expected to measure and record their own feelings. 
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The AIL program in action and how it affects people 
An extract from a session in MSC gives insight into the concrete workings of the AIL 
program. It is the eighth session. In the room are two patients, two nurses, and myself, sitting 
outside the circle as an observer, taking notes. The patients have brought their workbooks. 
They are going to learn about warning signs of psychosis: 
 
Nurse, (directed to the patients): Today we’re going to learn how to recognise and grade warning signs. 
You have to register the warning signs every day, and you begin here at day one (points at the formula 
in the workbook). When you’ve registered for one week, a pattern will emerge. If the curve is 
completely flat, you’ve perhaps had a good period. You also have to compare the curve with what 
you’ve done. This is also a registration of stressful events. The homework for the next session is to fill 
out the form. 
 
Following this teaching session, a video is shown about a boy, Anders, who is worried about 
hearing voices and sleeping poorly. The lesson to be learnt from the video is that Anders 
should contact a person he knows well or a doctor to get help (which usually means increased 
medicine dosage). After the video session, the nurses try to establish a conversation with the 
patients about Anders’ problems, but that proved to be difficult. The nurses asked whether the 
patients had similar problems as Anders’, but they hardly said a word. They looked down and 
replied politely when spoken to. I felt the atmosphere in the room to be tense. For some of the 
patients, with whom I spoke later, I think the silence was an expression of avoidance, a subtle 
resistance by retreating. 
 
Some of the patients in the rehabilitation unit did not have the kinds of symptoms that were 
expected of psychotic individuals. The course however was still compulsory. The following is 
an extract from a session where this is the case. 
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Nurse to the patient: Do you record your symptoms daily as requested? 
P: No, I haven’t come that far. 
N: What stops you from doing so? 
P: I don’t have such symptoms. 
N: Does Peter (the nurse who is in charge of him) agree? 
P: Yes, he does. I don’t have symptoms, and it’s not my fault. 
N: Yes, but it’s important anyway to be observant about symptoms […]What do you benefit most from 
here? 
P: I’m looking for an apartment to rent. 
N: It’s okay that you use your energy on this. But it’s important that you can recognise symptoms when 
you’re going to live alone. 
 
It appears as if the nurse's obligation to follow the program overshadows the patient’s actual 
experience. When the session was over, the patient rushed out in a hurry. He was red in his 
face and clearly upset.  A nurse said after the patients left: ‘It’s difficult to make the group 
dynamic now. Nevertheless I think they benefit from it’. Later I spoke with the patient in the 
smoking-room. He said that he had nothing to learn from this program. He had been living for 
years in his own apartment and need not learn to live alone, he said. His problem, according 
to himself, was drug abuse that went out of control when his girlfriend died. He explained his 
psychotic episodes as a result of using too much amphetamine.  
 
Patients often interpret ‘symptoms’ differently from the professionals. At Sunhill, 
professionals and patients often disagreed about having warning signs or not. Professionals 
more often than patients believed that patients experienced warning signs, therefore 
disagreeing about the usefulness of AIL. In general the nurses considered the program as 
more useful and beneficial than the patients did. Below is an excerpt from an interview with 
one of the nurses (Anna) who was active in introducing the AIL at Sunhill several years ago. 
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 Anna: Many of the patients had developed strange coping strategies… before they came here …in order 
to learn to live with themselves. It takes time to make them unlearn and relearn new coping strategies.. 
[…] 
T: There may be some who think they aren’t so ill? Is it difficult if you…? 
A: Yes, that is difficult. There are many who think they are not ill. But…usually they want to join 
anyway[…] Even if they don’t admit that they’re ill, they have a  slight suspicion that something is 
wrong ( laughs a bit). […]  There are very few who don’t want to attend the AIL course. They want it. 
And it’s so good. They learn a lot on that course about coping with symptoms. It’s so useful, and such a 
good course. 
 
Indeed, some patients thought there was ‘something wrong’ with them, in spite of the fact that 
they were sceptical to the AIL program and reluctant to label themselves as schizophrenic. 
Like Danny, who told me of his ‘strange ideas’  
I thought that the the Leonids ( a meteor shower, my comment) from space should come and take me 
away. Although it was frightening, it was a thrilling experience too. I looked at a pattern on the wall and  
was convinced that it was the Leonids formatting on the wall. I asked one of the nurses if she could see 
it too, and she said yes, she saw it. However, I did not dare to tell most people about my experiences, 
because they would believe I was mad. So I kept it to myself. 
 
Such ‘strange ideas’ and ‘wrongness’ were dealt with differently. Some of the staff did not 
object to the patients’ experiences. They even joined the ‘strange ideas’, particularly outside 
the serious atmosphere of the MSC. Moreover, it seemed that some of the nurses were 
attracted to the ‘strangeness’ and the ‘wrongness’. One nurse said about a patient: ‘He is so 
psychotic. It’s beautiful. What that guy can see in the stars’. Thus, along with suffering, there 
was beauty and excitement, but this was not recognised by the AIL program. Patients are 
simply not supposed to enjoy their illness (Barrett, 1996). When patients did not express their 
psychotic experiences in an open manner, they were usually perceived as ‘better’. Therefore 
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many patients soon learned how to hide their thoughts. One patient said to one of the 
therapists: ‘When I look down and say nothing, you think I’m well, when I start to speak, you 
think I’m ill’. In the psychiatric unit and in the AIL program, patients are supposed to speak 
about themselves, but when speaking freely about ‘strange’ things, they are perceived as ‘very 
ill’. There is a common expectation that people should reveal their inner thought when they 
are assigned for psychiatric treatment, but the opposite can be the case. The nurses were 
expected to limit ‘psychotic talk’ by making the patient talk about something else, or by 
secluding the patient in his room. Usually the staff followed this unwritten rule, presumably 
having been taught that patients may get worse if psychotic experiences are given attention 
(Leudar & Thomas, 2000). Sometimes, however, the nurses just let ‘madness’ flourish, 
joining into the ‘craziness’, laughing and joking together with patients. Such kind of humour 
seemed to ease tension for both patients and staff.  
 
On the other side, the nurses were occupied with motivating the patients to attend to the AIL- 
course, while patients were occupied with different matters, such as getting money or 
cigarettes, which was a big issue in the smoking-room. Talks about girls was also a common 
theme there, as most of the clientele were young men. Indeed, I had the impression that lack 
of a girl-friend was one of the biggest problems. Impotence as a side-effect of psychotropic 
drugs was also a problem, but these issues were not raised in the AIL sessions, probably 
because the conversations in the sessions were restricted by the AIL workbook which did not 
hold such topics. 
 
Sometimes the professionals made deviations from the AIL program. There were many events 
which were ‘merely’ social. At times I felt that I was part of a cosy, not very disciplined 
family, particularly during Christmas preparations when patients and nurses were engaged in 
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baking and making Christmas sweets. There was no AIL program for several weeks. Even 
some of the shy patients now voluntarily chose to participate, looking more spontaneous and 
less tense in these situations. Quite often the nurses and the physiotherapist made trips outside 
the institution with a group of patients. Such activities included seeing a movie, walking and 
strolling in the woods, swimming in a nearby pool, going to a cafeteria etc. In such relaxed 
contexts, the patients laughed, participated and seemed to enjoy themselves. The staff pointed 
out that patients often changed for the better when they went on trips outside the institution, 
and staff themselves seemed to enjoy these occasions too. Normal communication in 
everyday settings seemed to contribute more to patients’ well-being than the AIL program. 
Several patients became friends during their stay at Sunhill, thus strengthening their network 
resources. 
 
Transforming subjectivities through classification, normalisation and examination 
One of the key objectives in the AIL program is to make patients unlearn and relearn new 
coping strategies, as outlined in the conversation with Anna. Such coping strategies imply that 
patients learn, accept and integrate the psychiatric definition of illness. Moreover, coping with 
life is learning about medicines in order to become medicine-compliant. Through these 
strategies, patients are supposed to obtain a larger degree of self-management. 
 
A relevant question is whether these coping strategies can be associated with the disciplinary 
techniques described by Foucault in Discipline and Punish (1977) and with his later work on 
self-technologies (1997). The core elements in the AIL program can be understood as 
technologies of management and self-management, as a way of training and transforming 
subjects, and as ‘a conduct of conduct’ (Foucault 2001a, p.341). Foucault (1977, p.170-196) 
describes ‘the means of correct training’ through various disciplinary techniques. At Sunhill, 
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with its strong emphasis on pedagogy, patients’ ‘conduct is ‘conducted’ particularly through 
the techniques of classification, normalisation and examination. I think that the AIL program 
can be viewed in this perspective, and in the next paragraphs I will elaborate such attempts at 
transforming subjectivities, however afterwards pointing at the limitations of such an 
approach. 
 
Classifications/observations: AIL cannot be disentangled from international psychiatric 
classification systems, such as DSM-IV (APA, 1995) or ICD-10 (WHO, 1994). These 
systems enable psychiatrists world-wide to define and diagnose symptoms of mental disease. 
The medical gaze is trained to scrutinize and classify. To examine, diagnose and to monitor 
the patient’s movement from illness to normality or vice versa is part of a medical education. 
The classifications of symptoms in the AIL program are much the same as outlined in the 
illness categories described in the DSM-IV and ICD-10, where every disease is perceived as a 
distinct entity with its own symptoms. A successful outcome of the educational program 
largely depends on the patient’s acceptance of such perceptions of disease.  
 
Diagnoses have several effects. For instance, some patients in the present study said it was a 
relief to be able to put a name to their problems; others resisted strongly the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. Besides, having a diagnosis is needed in order to gain certain advantages in the 
welfare system, such as sick-leave or disability pension. On the other hand, such classification 
systems may be understood as a part of a governmentalising enterprise, as powerful tools of 
configuring and surveying people. Patients are expected to adopt new strategies by learning to 
‘manage symptoms’. When a patient is diagnosed with schizophrenia, the professionals 
automatically look for and report pre-defined symptoms. Moreover, anti-psychotic medicines 
were almost always prescribed for patients in this study without debate. The term 
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‘schizophrenia’ triggers some automatic responses in the staff (and in patients too, as long as 
they accept their illness). This is perhaps an example of what Gordon calls ‘techniques of 
power designed to observe, monitor, shape and control the behaviour of individuals’ (Gordon 
1991, p.3). I will argue that Foucault’s notion of governmentality has even more significance 
today in the way standard classifications (such as the DSM and ICD) and standard programs 
(such as the AIL) have been elaborated in detail in order to govern people from a distance. It 
is to govern ‘each and all’ (Gordon 1991, p.3) through micro programs which the experts are 
taught to administer. It is to totalise and individualise, to see and control each individual as 
well as teaching people to monitor themselves. In such a way the health and welfare of the 
collective is governed by letting the expert authorities teach the marginalised people to govern 
themselves.  
 
Normalisation: The idea of normality is pervasive in Norwegian society: e.g. national 
standards for educational programs, for social aid and for medical practice. The AIL program 
aims at improving the quality of life of suffering patients. However, viewed from another 
angle, it can also be conceived of as a normalisation program. Patients have to accept the 
standard psychiatric definition of mental illness, also termed ‘insight into one’s own illness’. 
Paradoxically, patients are told that in order to get well, they have to accept that they are ill. 
To obtain ‘insight into one’s own illness’ is by most health professionals regarded as an 
important step on the way to recovery (Flyckt  et al, 1999).  Estroff’s studies of the relation 
between the self-concept and explanations of suffering are relevant in this context. Her work 
indicates that psychiatric patients who define themselves as ill lose their sense of themselves 
as competent individuals and gradually come to see themselves as incompetent.  She suggests 
that learning to be a patient is a way to chronicity (Estroff 1993). Thus the price of 
‘normality’ could be chronicity, paradoxical as it may seem.  
 17
 Examination and self-examination: Examination is a clue in Foucault’s analysis of discipline. 
The examination, according to Foucault (1977) is a method of control that combines 
hierarchical observation with normative judgment.  It is a prime example of power-knowledge 
in Foucault’s terms, since it combines into a unified whole the deployment of force and the 
establishment of ‘truth’. It both elicits the truth about those who undergo the examination, 
(tells what they know/should know or what the state of their health is) and controls their 
behaviour (by directing them to a course of treatment). Control and registration of every detail 
of individual behaviour was indeed the aim of the new strategies of discipline, as described by 
Foucault (1977). 
 
The relationship between power-knowledge and examination is significant in the AIL 
program.  Warning signs and persistent symptoms are predefined, and the multiple-choice 
exam requires the ‘right’ answer. In this way it is possible to control whether patients have 
accepted the knowledge presented to them or not. Patients’ bodies or souls are minutely 
registered day by day. The system’s efficacy is further developed when patients learn to self-
examine and self-report themselves on the registration formula. Patients are supposed to 
monitor their own ‘symptoms’ every day by writing down the strength and duration of 
symptoms in the registration formula. If they have a ‘good’ period, the curve is flat. If it is 
not, they are expected to seek help, usually to be persuaded that they need more medicines. 
Thus, they are governed not only as objects of psychiatric disciplines but also as self-
scrutinizing and self-forming subjects. 
 
Resistance strategies to the AIL program 
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However, as I suggested, this analysis has its limitations. According to my field experiences, 
people are not as easily formed as the AIL presupposes. Both patients and helpers proved to 
be unpredictable and complex, as the many paradoxes in the data reveal.  
 
Foucault in his later work to a larger degree acknowledged the individual’s freedom and 
resistance. He focused on the mobility and instability of power relations, making statements 
such as ‘there is no relationship of power without the means of escape or possible flight’ 
(Foucault, 2001a, p.346). Relations of power and strategies of resistance are intertwined, and 
the freedom that is a necessary condition for relations of power is therefore the very thing that 
allows the possibility of resistance.  
 
Several patients developed resistance or avoidance strategies in different ways. Sometimes 
they did not show up to the AIL-session without any excuse, even though it was obligatory, or 
they appeared mentally absent during the session, looking down, not really participating. The 
staff tended to interpret such withdrawal as part of the illness syndrome. However, even some 
of the nurses were sceptical about the courses, but they said it was part of their job to go 
through with the program. They pointed out that many of the patients were highly educated 
people, and thought that the program was a way of patronising them. One nurse said: ‘It’s a 
bit like looking down on them from above’. Another stated: ‘It’s a bit banal, I feel almost 
embarrassed to present such stuff to the patients. But, on the other hand, it’s been developed 
by highly competent people. They say they’ve used the program with good results in other 
countries. They’ve done research …but I’m a bit ambivalent’.  
 
Patients seldom voiced their resistance against the AIL program directly in the ‘public’ areas, 
but they discussed the program when the staff was not present, for instance in the smoking 
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room. These patients did not necessarily disagree that mental illness existed, but they did not 
think the diagnosis was appropriate for them. They did not accept that the problems they had 
were symptoms of schizophrenia. Reluctance to accept the illness definition was called ‘lack 
of insight’ by most of the staff and was interpreted as part of the illness (see also Blackman, 
2007, p.8). When I was talking with the patients alone or in the smoking room, they would tell 
me about all sorts of problems. The smoking room was a ‘free area’ in the eyes of the 
patients. They played ‘underground’  rock music, smoking cigarettes  incessantly, sometimes  
cannabis too,  I heard, which was a reason to close down  what the doctor called ‘an 
unacceptable subculture within a psychiatric institution’, however  against fierce  protests 
from  several  patients. The smoking room was a site through which very different stories 
started to emerge, circulate and gain currency. Patients told me that they had problems or 
experiences such as being anxious, hearing voices, having difficulties in sleeping, worrying 
about their financial situation, being unemployed, having no girl-friend, being lonely, being 
abducted by UFOs at night (Terkelsen, et al 2005) or being controlled by neighbours through 
satellites in space. Such issues were not discussed during the AIL lessons. One girl spoke 
about her feelings of depression and despair during three suicide attempts. She had dropped 
out of school, because the voices inside her head were so loud that she could not hear what the 
teacher said. However, she did not define herself as schizophrenic. Thus, several patients 
simply did not integrate the knowledge presented by the psychiatric staff, which in turn 
tended to see resistance against the diagnosis as a symptom of the illness itself. One patient, 
who was quite articulate in formulating his dislike for both medication and the AIL program, 
said that he was being exposed to ‘thought control’. ‘I am 100% sure that I am not 
schizophrenic, I need vitamins instead of those brain medicines’, he declared several times.  
When he was confronted with the schizophrenia diagnosis in a therapy session, he opposed 
the therapist fiercely by saying that ‘you try to take away my thoughts, why do you do that? I 
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feel it’s almost a violation’. Claiming his right to believe in UFOs, angels and vampires, he 
said ‘I believe in what I believe in, no matter what you say’. The therapist commented after 
the session that the patient’s prognosis was gloomy, because of ‘his complete lack of insight 
into his illness, his drug abuse and his refusal to take antipsychotic medicines’. 
 
Throwing medicines into the toilet was also a strategy used by patients. Some of the nurses 
felt they were being manipulated or cheated by patients who tried to spit out the tablets when 
the nurses were not watching them. This was usually detected by blood-tests which revealed 
medicine non-compliance. In these cases the therapist tried to persuade the patient to accept 
depot medication, an injection with effects that last for three months.  
 
However, relations of power and resistance were not necessarily characterised by a ‘staff 
against patients relation’ and vice versa. On the contrary, patients often spoke well of both 
therapists and nurses, and many patients seemed to be particularly attached to ‘their’ therapist 
or nurse. I was at first surprised by this paradox: patients who revealed resistance and non-
compliance at the same time seemed to have good relations with their nurse or therapist. 
Moreover, professionals often gave in to patients’ will. Sometimes a nurse or a therapist 
together with a patient would create a powerful dyad against other professionals. The nurse or 
therapist commonly defended ‘his’ or ‘her’ patient’s interests at staff meeting. At times this 
staff member also functioned as ‘a lawyer’ for a patient, towards other institutions, such as the 
bank, the social security office, other hospitals etc. The patients were very interested in having 
such a defence to promote their interests, and they might even take medicines in return. A 
patient said straight out: ‘I don’t like the pills, but I will take them for the sake of my nurse’. 
 
Negotiating illness and health 
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I will argue that subjectivity should not be reduced to a question of disciplinary technologies 
on one side and resistance, escape or freedom on the other side. As Cohen points out (1994, p. 
23)’ the self is not a monolith, it is plastic, variable and complex’. It is ‘inconsistent, a 
chameleon, adapting to specific persons with whom it interacts and to the specific 
circumstances of each interaction’ (p. 98).  
 
Patients are throughout the AIL program urged to accept that they are ill. According to my 
field notes, they respond to this by rejecting or accepting that they are ill. A third response is 
ambivalence and uncertainty about being ill or not, trying to judge themselves on a scale from 
‘normal’ to ill. Indeed, the same person may shift between rejection, acceptance and 
ambivalence. Thus, being a patient can be considered a practice which involves slipping 
between different, multiple subjectivities, negotiating between ‘normality’ and illness.  
 
As I pointed out, several patients resisted the diagnosis schizophrenia. At the same time many 
felt that there was something ‘wrong’ with them.  Patients heard and saw things that nobody 
else did, and sometimes they became confused of what was in their head, and what was ‘real’. 
Yet, they so much wanted to be ‘normal’ and do the same things as ‘normal’ people were able 
to do, however not wishing to give in to the normalisation-technologies described in the AIL.  
 
Both patients and staff made negotiations about the boundaries of normality; they asked 
themselves whether certain thoughts, behaviour or feelings would match the criteria of being 
ill or not. The following is an example of such negotiations.  Billy, a 19 year old boy and I, 
are sitting in Billy’s bedroom, talking about his problems hearing male, angry voices mocking 
him. ‘They all the time tell me I’m stupid, gay and worth nothing’ he says. His therapist has 
recently told him that he is suffering from schizophrenia. Billy puts an information-booklet 
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about schizophrenia in front of me on the table, drawing a line on the sheet, dividing it into 
two pieces, about ¼ and ¾, saying: ‘I’m perhaps that much ill (pointing at the smallest part), 
but the rest of me is healthy. So, I’m only one fourth ill’. He tells me that he is relieved to 
learn what is wrong with him. Finally there is an explanation to his suffering and a label on 
his condition. Later however, he complains that the diagnosis did not solve anything, he still 
feels miserable.  In the smoking room he said to me: ’I’m afraid that I’m never going to be 
normal, that I will not be able to work or do other normal things’.  
 
After a while the therapists and nurses become bewildered regarding what kind of illness 
Billy is suffering from. In a staff meeting the nurse Lisa says ‘Billy doesn’t have the look of a 
schizophrenic. I think his voices are more thoughts in his head than real voices’ The therapist 
agrees and says that Billy is not able to be psychotic more than half an hour when he is given 
no attention. ‘That’s not schizophrenia’, he claims. He writes in the medical record that: ‘It 
seems that Billy is manipulating himself in and out of a psychotic condition’. The 
antipsychotic medication (Zyprexa) is terminated, and the nurses are told not to focus on his 
‘symptoms’ anymore, because it may worsen his condition. Besides, Billy is not to attend the 
MSC, because it is assumed that he does not have those symptoms. His condition does not fit 
into the program anymore. According to the therapist’s written record, there were no 
‘psychotic breakthroughs’ reported after this change of treatment strategy. Consequently, the 
problem ‘auditory hallucinations’ was deleted from the treatment plan. One month later, 
however, the problem returned, formulated as ‘inexpedient ways of coping with voices’. In 
the meantime, the therapist tries to find the right diagnosis for Billy. He does not resume the 
schizophrenia diagnosis, but decides on post-traumatic stress syndrome (PST). Billy tells me  
that he is relieved to get a diagnosis which he perceives as less serious than schizophrenia. 
Nevertheless the nurses report in the record that ‘he is worried that he might not be a normal 
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boy’. After a while, the PST diagnosis is abandoned too. The therapist writes that Billy does 
not match the criteria of PST  because ‘he lacks an extreme stressful situation’. Instead, he 
writes that Billy ‘satisfies the criteria of adjustment disorders, code F43.2’ (in the ICD-10, my 
comment), due to the fact that ‘extended psychological stress and poor coping abilities may 
have provoked a similar illness’.  
 
 
 
This story is an example of the ambiguity of illness categories and the unclear boundaries of 
normality. Billy’s illness was negotiated from ‘schizophrenia’ to PST, to the less stigmatizing 
‘adjustment disorder’. It seems that the ICD- classification system find spaces for conditions 
that do not fit traditional illness categories. Billy was indeed relieved; he could maintain his 
self-concept as a normal boy, and in his own eyes he was now only a badly adjusted person 
due to stress, which might be the fate of many ‘normal’ people. Moreover, the professionals 
told him that his voices more likely could be unpleasant thoughts than real voices.  Billy 
found this reassuring; he more easily could look at himself as ‘normal’ iv. In this way one of 
the main symptoms of schizophrenia, ‘auditory hallucinations’ were transformed to 
‘thoughts’. The story is also an example  not only of resistance to diagnostic categories but 
also of how the validity of the categories themselves is to some extent accomplished through 
successful attempts by professionals to apply them and by the acceptance of Billy (i.e. of the 
situated construction of schizophrenia itself).  It shows the complexities of power relations 
and how power can be reproduced at the micro-level of individual diagnoses.  
 
Hearing voices was sometimes a subject in the smoking room. It did not happen very often, 
because it seemed to be a very private matter. Billy however, spoke openly about his voices in 
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the smoking room. He was comforted to hear that several of the other patients heard voices 
too. He thought he was the only one. One of the ‘veterans’, who had heard voices for years, 
gave Billy advice how to cope with them: ‘Don’t let them bother you, they won’t hurt you. 
Just yell back and tell them to shut up. Probably they won’t go away, but after a while you 
don’t care about them anymore.’ Billy told me afterwards that this conversation had been of 
great help, mostly because he learned that hearing voices was common among the other 
patients too. Thus, ‘hearing voices’ in the smoking room is different from 'hearing voices' in 
the treatment plan or in the staff’s meeting room. 
 
Lisa Blackman’s research on the Hearing Voices Network (HVN) is interesting in this context 
(Blackman,  2001, 2007). This network, initiated by the works of Romme and Escher (1993) 
encourages people to become friends with the voices, to enter into a dialogue with them, and 
to use the positive voices to deal with the unwanted voices instead of denying the voices.  
Blackman describes a technology and a workbook developed by and for voice-hearers, i.e. 
how to cope with voices, how to use them as a resource and how to incorporate them instead 
of working against them. This is a different frame of reference than the approach described in 
the case of Billy where professionals interpret voices as symptoms of psychopathology. HVN 
seems to offer a kind of agency which allows voice-hearers to actively take part in the shaping 
and reshaping of voices. I assume that such a network may contribute to reframe voice-
hearing from a symptom of schizophrenia to a ‘normal’ activity.  
 
According to my field experiences it seemed that at least two kinds of subjectivities co-exist 
side by side within the same subject.  One was the resistant subject, rejecting the 
patologisation of the AIL program, refusing to integrate a chronic ill identity. The other 
subjectivity was aspiring for a ‘normal’ identity, ‘being normal, doing what normal people 
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do’. Billy was relieved when he could define himself on the ‘right’ side of normality. Several 
of the other patients in my study had the same aspirations as Billy.  Such a duality is described 
in Luhrmann’s portrait of homeless women in Chicago. They live within two codes, she 
writes:  ‘One code is appropriate to the middle-class world to which they aspire, the other one 
enables them to survive on the street’[…] ‘The subjectivity they share is the challenge of 
negotiating two competing and contradictory sets of display rules’ (Luhrmann, 2006, p.347).  
 
The question at hand is how patients suffering from severe mental health difficulties are 
negotiating competing display rules. They live in two different worlds, in which one is a 
shared ‘normal’ world; a world comprised of ‘normal talk’ display rules, which they try to 
comply with. The other world is their ‘psychotic’ world which they often try to keep secret, 
hiding their experiences of UFOs, Leonids, voice-hearing etc.  The suffering, according to my 
field experiences, lies in the struggle of constantly negotiating between the demands of these 
two worlds. It is a lonely quest. I therefore do believe that more attention should be given to 
the struggle of living in two worlds/realities, creating a space for both patients and 
professionals to explore such experiences in depth. The Hearing Voices Network I believe is 
an example of the creation of such a space. 
 
Movements of resistance 
There are and have been other networks and movements too that challenge mainstream 
psychiatry. Just to mention a few: The anti-psychiatric movement in the nineteen-sixties 
(Laing, 1967, Cooper, 1967), the Soteria project (Mosher 1999) and the contemporary Mad 
Pride (2008) and Mind Freedom International (2009).The latter is an international coalition of 
more than hundred grassroots groups. According to Wikipedia (2008), Mind Freedom has 
been recognized by the United Nations Economic and Social Council as a human rights non-
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governmental organisation with a consultative status to the UN. Thus, Mind Freedom 
International has gained considerable formal influence. 
 
Nick Crossley gives an  historic account  of how such movements have evolved, and how 
patients, or survivors  as they prefer to call themselves, have developed strategies to resist 
psychiatric domination by making  efforts to present themselves as ‘not being mentally ill’  
(Crossley, 2004, p. 161). A ‘survivor’ creates other mental images than a ‘victim’. A survivor 
is not a person who is weak, helpless and dependent, but a strong and potent person who has 
had the nerve and strength to ‘survive’ the stressors of modern psychiatry. According to these 
movements (for instance ‘Mad Pride’) one needs courage to survive both chemo-therapy, 
ECT and the stigma associated by being labelled ‘schizophrenic’. In this way the survivors 
have transformed their negative experience from weakness to strength, to something they can 
be proud of, something worthy the admiration of others. Moreover, they reclaimed the 
stigmatizing word ‘mad’ into their own vocabulary as ‘mad pride’. By this, they reconfigure 
the very content of ‘madness’ by situating it into another context, for their own benefit, just 
like for example the gay-movement has done before them (Crossley, 2004, pp.61-180). Some 
of these movements have transformed themselves from representing an underprivileged class 
without a voice to become a voice of power (at least to a certain degree) among politicians 
and health – planners, as well as in the media and in organisations such as the UN. 
 
Conclusion:  
Psychiatric knowledge with its predefined concepts of illness has become so powerful that not 
only professionals but also patients tend to become its defenders. Concepts like ‘thought 
disorders’ and ‘delusions’ are taken for granted in a biomedical psychiatric power-knowledge 
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framework. Patients are expected to subdue their perceptions of reality in order to accept and 
integrate medical knowledge and understanding, where medicine-compliance is a crucial part 
of the education. The AIL program, the ICD-10 classifications of mental illness (WHO, 
1992), and the expert knowledge that such technologies represent, are entangled parts of  a 
large system of governmental technologies, institutions  and procedures, not only located at 
Sunhill or in Norway, but globally spread. Thus, psycho- educational programs can be viewed 
as a part of a larger social enterprise or governmentality. Foucault’s descriptions of discipline 
and normalisation through training and examinations have proved to be relevant in this 
context. 
One conclusion is therefore that modern psychiatry succeeds in recruiting self-forming 
subjectivities that master and monitor themselves - but only partly.  Many patients who seek 
help to find out what is wrong with them, do not/will not integrate the explanation offered to 
them by the psychiatric profession. Even professionals are bewildered about what is wrong, 
and sometimes they even doubt their own explanations. Often the patients’ stories about 
hearing voices, being abducted by UFO’s etc are not listened to in depth and interpreted on 
the premises of the patient, partly because doctors are trained to concentrate on the ‘right’ 
diagnosis and the ‘right’ medicine, including monitoring the effects of medicines.  
 
Although subjectivity and experience are both regulated by power relations, they have the 
potential to exceed and subvert them. According to Dean (2007, p.9), ‘Power is […]more like 
a duel than a total system of subordination.’ AIL as a technology of self-production or 
responsibilisation shows that subjectivities cannot be read off directly from an analysis of the 
techniques themselves, because people often act in a different manner than what they are 
expected to do. Thus more research should be done in this area of the mental health field, i.e. 
to study how people accept or reject biomedical power-knowledge and how power-relations 
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are enacted in everyday settings. Power creates resistance (and avoidance) on an individual 
level, as revealed in my empirical material, but also on a larger scale, as shown by the 
formation of various movements initiated by patients, ex-patients and professionals, who in 
one way or the other have negative experiences with mainstream psychiatry. Stories about 
such experiences are for example to be found under ‘Personal Stories’ on the Mind Freedom 
web-site (2008). 
It seems that some user- groups contribute to another kind of self-conception in patients/ex-
patients/survivors, because the very notion of illness is contested. These groups are based on 
different kinds of self- technologies than the ones described in the AIL-program. Although 
these movements also have developed programs, they are different, because they are 
grounded in people’s own experiences and conceptions.  
 
In spite of enactments of resistance which I have described in this paper, many patients feel 
that something is wrong with them, even though they do not accept the illness-definition 
presented to them by psychiatric professionals. They try to find out what is going on with 
them, why they see and hear things that others do not perceive. They want to be ‘normal’ in 
the eyes of themselves and others. However, the AIL’s  normalisation-, self-observation-  and 
self-examination- techniques, designed to normalise and ‘conduct people’s conduct’  
(Foucault,2001a, p. 341), are of a different kind than the normalisation technologies  
developed  in the context of the consumer/ex-patient/survivor movements.  The difference lies 
in the deconstruction of illness itself. In the survivors’ eyes, their experiences are perhaps 
unusual, but they are not signs of illness, and can be dealt with as normal human expressions 
of stressful events. Moreover, being ‘unusual’, can be transformed to something positive, for 
example being unique and creative (see the Mad Pride 2008 website). In this way, the 
reshaping of one’s self- concept seems to be at the very core of such movements.  
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 I do not claim that joining user movements is a suitable solution for everyone, or that serious 
mental health problems do not exist. What I ask for however, is  less emphasis on psychiatric 
diagnoses,  medicine compliance and ‘insight into own illness’,  less emphasis on standard 
programs designed  by professional health experts,  more political and economical support to 
user-movements, more  freedom for  patients and professionals to explore the multiplicity of 
subjectivities in an open manner, and finally, a different epistemology based on categories 
more in line with how patients/users describe their experiences, which again would imply 
radical changes in professionals’ education and training.   
Notes: 
i All names are pseudonyms. 
 
ii I did not ask the explicit  ages of the professionals, but they were between 30 and 60, with 
the majority between 35 and 45. 
 
iii The research project has been reviewed and accepted by the Norwegian Committee of 
Medical Ethics. 
 
iv Shortly afterwards, Billy was discharged. Six months later he phoned me. He was now 
admitted in an acute unit in another town. He was really sad, he told me, because he had got 
back his first diagnosis schizophrenia by the new therapists. 
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